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Appellant Safe Home Control, Inc. ("Safe Home" or "Appellant") has appealed a 
decision by the Honorable Christine Johnson setting aside a confession of judgment in 
Safe Home's favor, and awarding attorneys' fees to Appellee Jared Munday ("Munday" 
or "Appellee"). In a succinct and well-reasoned order, Judge Johnson found the 
Confession of Judgment failed to comply with Rule 58A(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on two bases: a) the failure to have a proper verification and jurat; and b) 
failure to set forth a "specific sum."' Judge Johnson also properly applied Utah's statute 
allowing for recovery of fees based upon a writing or contract, since the contract at hand 
would have allowed Safe Home to recover its fees in an action for confession of 
judgment. As a result, this Court should affirm Judge Johnson's decision in its entirety. 
Safe Home now contends that the 1933 decision in White v. Heber City refutes 
Judge Johnson's reliance on the 1989 decision in Mickelson v. Craigco, Inc. as to what 
constitutes a proper jurat and verification. Safe Home's argument, however, ignores the 
Supreme Court's decision in Worthington & Kimball Const. Co. v. C&A Devel. Co. 777 
P.2d 475 (Utah 1989). These subsequent cases establish that an alleged verification fails 
when, as here, the affiant himself makes no oath or affirmation in writing. Indeed, the 
alleged verification in Worthington is remarkably similar to the one Safe Home had 
Munday sign. Since Worthington and Mickelson are controlling, this Court should find 
that the verification fails. Because Mickelson and Worthington address the issue at hand, 
2 
moreover, Safe Home's reliance on extra-jurisdictional cases is unavailing. 
Safe Home has also ignored the dramatically changed landscape for confessions of 
judgment initiated by D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972) and Swarb v. 
Lenox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), along with the United States Supreme Court's analysis of 
how Due Process restricts the procedures for judgments by confession. The earlier 
decisions that Safe Home cites must therefore be read against the backdrop of this 
modem interpretation of Due Process and limited accordingly. Indeed, the entirety of the 
Utah scheme for judgments by confession is invalid, under the analysis set forth in Isbell 
v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61, 75, 577 P.2d 188 (1978) (invalidating procedure 
virtually identical to UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)). The critical missing factor as identified in 
Isbell is the lack of assurance that the constitutional rights to a jury trial are freely and 
knowingly waived. 
Safe Home also fails to refute Judge Johnson's finding that the jurat was 
inadequate because it failed to include that Munday was signing voluntarily and that he 
had presented identification to the notary. Safe Home's failure to address this dispositive 
argument is also fatal to its appeal. 
Safe Home's arguments as to the "sum certain" also ignore Judge Johnson's sound 
reasoning on this point. The Confession of Judgment at hand sets out no process, 
procedure, or calculation for additions to or deductions from the judgment amount. As 
Judge Johnson noted, "[t]here is no information as to how the decision on those amounts 
3 
will be made. . . . Any amount that may have been paid on this debt as referenced in the 
Judgment is not known.'? The discretion provided Safe Home in the Confession of 
Judgment makes it entirely different from the process embedded in Rules 54 and 55, 
UTAH R. Crv. P., for judgments and default judgments in general, and Safe Home's 
analogy to those rules must fail as a result. 
Safe Home also argues that Munday waived his right to contest the specified sum. 
Safe Home, however, never presented this argument to Judge Johnson, and therefore it is 
Safe Home who has waived this argument. 
Finally, Safe Home contends that Judge Johnson erred in awarding Munday his 
attorneys' fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826, by claiming that the process 
for recording a judgment by confession is not a "civil action." In doing so, Safe Home 
ignores clear Utah case law interpreting the statute at issue as implementing a simple 
degree of fairness and equity. Safe Home would have recovered attorneys' fees if it was 
successful; indeed, it argues repeatedly that the Confession of Judgment here could be so 
augmented. If Safe Home could have recovered fees, so could Munday. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Generally, Munday does not take issue with Safe Home's statement of the issues 
on appeal. [App. Brief, at 1-2.] Munday does, however, wish to supplement that 
statement with two additional matters and one other issue for the Court to consider. 
First, Safe Home argues that Munday had waived his arguments as to the 
2 R.0986. 
I. The Case. 
On November 18, 2015, Munday and Safe Home signed a "2016 Regional 
Manager Agreement," (the "Agreement") pursuant to which Munday agreed to provide 
certain services to Safe Home. [R.0010-30.] Pursuant to that Agreement, Safe Home 
4 
Confession of Judgment not being for a "sum certain." [Id. at 19-20.] Safe Home, 
however, did not argue this point below. Among other things, Safe Home does not cite 
where in the record it preserved this argument. 
Second, the standard of review of attorneys' fees is correctness because Safe 
Home is challenging whether fees were allowable under the UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5- 
826. See Federated Capital Corp. v. Haner, 2015 UT App 132, ,r 10, 351 P.3d 816 (citing 
Hooban v. Unicity Int'!, Inc., 2009 UT App 287, ,r,r 6-7, 220 P.3d 485, aff'd, 2012 UT 40, 
285 P.3d 766). However, Safe Home is not challenging in this appeal the amount of fees 
Judge Johnson awarded to Munday. 
Third, if this Court finds that Safe Home complied with the applicable Confession 
of Judgment statute and rule (which Munday believes the Court will not find), then 
Munday argues that the applicable statute and rule violates Utah and federal guarantees 
of Due Process. See Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61, 75, 577 P.2d 188 (1978) 
(invalidating procedure virtually identical to UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)). "Constitutional 
challenges to statutes present questions of law, which [ this Court] review[ s] for 
correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ,r 5, 86 P.3d 735. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
5 
paid Munday a "Signing Bonus" of $160,000. [R.0013.] Also signed at that time was 
paperwork ostensibly allowing Safe Home to obtain a Judgment by Confession against 
Munday for the $160,000 Signing Bonus plus an unspecified amount for attorney's fees 
and costs, plus interest at "the statutory post-judgment interest rate," less amounts paid by 
Munday before entry of judgment. [R.0001-03.] Munday thus had no way to know how 
much any judgment would be at the time he signed the Agreement. Safe Home's right to 
file the judgment was also contingent on Munday' s alleged breach of the Agreement, 
such as failing to work for the specified term. 
Munday's signature on the Judgment by Confession was notarized by Edward 
Michael Prignano, the general counsel for Safe Home. [R.0002.] The jurat says that the 
statement was "subscribed and sworn" before Mr. Prignano, but nothing says what those 
words mean. [See id.] More importantly, Munday does not himself say he swore to 
anything. [See id.] 
II. The Proceedings Below 
Munday stopped working for Safe Home, claiming Safe Home had breached the 
Agreement. [See R.0031-32.] On April 18, 2016, Safe Home attempted to have the 
Judgment by Confession entered. [See R.0001-03.] On April 27, 2016, Munday filed his 
Motion to Set the Judgment Aside. [R.0004-09.] On July 29, 2016, the Court directed 
that an evidentiary hearing be held in the matter. [R.0112.] Due to stipulated 
continuances between the parties and accepted by the Court, the hearing took place on 
6 
3 Judge Johnson did not decide many of the issues, including the issue of 
unconscionability that was the subject of the evidentiary hearing and Munday's 
constitutional challenge. In the event this Court accepts Safe Home's arguments in this 
appeal, Munday respectfully submits that this case should be remanded to the District 
Court to consider in the first instance the additional issues briefed but not decided. See, 
e.g., Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ,r 29, 332 P.3d 900 (remanding "to 
allow district court to address the [ constitutional] issue in the first instance"). 
June 15, 2017. [R.0272-274.] The primary issues at that hearing focused on whether the 
Confession of Judgment provision in the Agreement was unconscionable, and whether 
enforcement of the Judgment by Confession would violate Due Process pursuant to D.H. 
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 177, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972). [See, e.g., R.0004- 
09; R.0088-100.] The parties, however, briefed a large number ofissues.3 
On October 20, 2017, the Honorable Christine Johnson granted Munday's Motion 
to Set Aside the Judgment by Confession. [R.0984-0988.] In so doing, Judge Johnson 
sidestepped the primary issues raised at the evidentiary hearing. Instead, Judge Johnson 
ruled that Safe Home failed to observe the requirements set forth in UT AH R. Crv. P. 
58A(i), which sets out the requires for a judgment by confession. [R.0984-988.] Judge 
Johnson specifically found that Safe Home did not provide the "verified statement" by 
Munday that Rule 58A(i) requires, and specifically rejected the notion that the jurat in 
connection with the notarization of Munday's signature was sufficient. [R.0985.] Judge 
7 
Judge Johnson's orders below were correct. 
1) There was not a valid statement verified by Munday along with the 
4 This is far from the first judgment by confession proceeding that Safe Home has lost on 
nearly identical paperwork. See e.g. Safe Home v. Grenny, Case No. 170400797, Safe 
Home v. Lee, Case No. 170400702, Safe Home v. Elgin, Case No. 170400746, Safe Home 
v. Clyde, Case No. 170400314, Safe Home v. Van Oakes, Case No. 170400176, Safe 
Home v. Sprinkle, Case No. 140401152. [See R.0502-0504.] 
Johnson also found that the use of a formula to determine the exact amount owed, along 
with the lack of figures to be used in that formula, resulted in the judgment not stating the 
"specific sum" that Rule 58A(i) requires. [R.0986.] 
Munday then filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§788-5-826, based upon the Agreement between Munday and Safe Home granted Safe 
Home the right to recover costs and attorneys' fees in any action on the judgment by 
confession. [R.0989-997.] On November 29, 2017, Judge Johnson granted Munday's 
motion in full. [R.1079-1085.] She specifically held that Munday was the "prevailing 
party," that an action for a judgment by confession was a "civil action" to which § 788-5- 
826 applied, that Munday's litigation strategy was appropriate, and that Munday's 
evidentiary support for its motion was sufficient.4 [Id.] Safe Home filed its Notice of 
Appeal on February 23, 2018. [R.1196-1198.J 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
8 
case, is inapposite. 
2) The jurat did not contain necessary statements, including statements that 
Munday signed the papers voluntarily, or that Munday provided proof of his identity to 
the notary. Safe Home does not argue this issue on appeal, and the judgment should be 
affirmed on this ground alone. 
3) The Confession of Judgment did not contain the necessary "specified sum" 
that UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)(l) requires. By its express terms, and as Judge Johnson 
found, the Confession of Judgment had discretionary language allowing for increases and 
deductions of unspecified amounts. There was no method delineated in the Confession of 
Judgment for calculating what payments or other deductions would be made. 
4) Safe Home's waiver argument as to the "specified sum" was not presented 
to the district court. As a result, this waiver argument is itself waived. 
Confession of Judgment. A basic requirement of a judgment by confession is that it be 
accompanied by a "statement[] verified by the defendant[.]" UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 58A(i). 
Utah law is clear that in order for there to be a valid verification, the affiant must himself 
or herself affirm the contents of the document under written oath. See Mickelson v. 
Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1989); Worthington &Kimball Const. Co. v. 
C&A Devel. Co., 777 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989). Here, the notary, and not Munday, 
signed after "Subscribed and Sworn" making this case distinctly similar to Worthington. 
Because of this, White v. Heber City, 82 Utah 547 (Utah 1933), Safe Home's primary 
9 
way of binding a man's property that was ever devised in any civilized country." D.H 
The United States Supreme Court has called a judgment by confession "the loosest 
I. Judge Johnson's Order Regarding The Invalidity Of The Confession Of 
Judgment Was Correct. 
ARGUMENT 
on appeal that the amount of fees awarded was incorrect. 
Johnson incorrectly used her discretion in awarding fees. Safe Home also does not argue 
known as 'civil action."' Safe Home also does not argue that if the statute applies, Judge 
overall. This includes Rule 2, which states "[t]here shall be one form of action to be 
phrase "civil action" must be read in conjunction with Rule 58A and the UTAH R. Crv. P. 
a "civil action" cannot withstand scrutiny. Among other things, that statute's use of the 
CODE ANN. §78B-5-826, and Safe Home's argument that a Confession of Judgment is not 
6) Judge Johnson appropriately awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to UTAH 
complied with the statute. 
down UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 58A(i), assuming it finds that Safe Home has otherwise 
important right. Munday respectfully asks this Court to take this opportunity to strike 
the lack of anything to suggest that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived this 
Court ruled that a virtually identical statutory scheme was facially unconstitutional due to 
right to a jury trial, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary. The California Supreme 
violative of Due Process. Because a confession of judgment waives the constitutional 
5) The entire scheme for confession of judgments is unconstitutional as 
10 
As Judge Johnson noted, the Confession of Judgment at issue does not have a 
18, 182 P.3d 362. 
notarization does not suffice. Determination of Rights to Use of Water, 2008 UT 25, ,r 
and (3) the latter must affix a proper jurat." Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 564. A simple 
signed by the affiant in the presence of a notary or other person authorized to take oaths, 
verification, "(l) there must be a correct written oath or affirmation, and (2) it must be 
UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i). The Utah Supreme Court has held that for there to be a valid 
A valid judgment by confession requires a statement verified by the defendant. 
A. Judge Johnson Correctly Found That The Confession of Judgment 
Lacks A Valid Verification. 
Id. Accord Lathrem v. Foreman, 168 Ohio St. 186, 151 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio 1958). 
Sears, 13 Utah 172, 177, 44 P. 832 (1896). Failure to do so renders the judgment void. 
confession must also strictly comply with the statutory process. Utah Nat 'l Bank v. 
procedure virtually identical to UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)). A party seeking a judgment by 
confession do not pass Constitutional muster. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 75 (invaliding 
Procedure); Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53. Poorly drafted procedures for judgment by 
N.W.2d 711, 713 (N.D. 1990) (interpreting Rule 68 of North Dakota Rules of Civil 
skepticism" and "strictly construed." Underwood Farmers Elevator v. Leidholm, 460 
P.3d 748, 752-53. Statutes and rules for a confession of judgment are also "viewed with 
As a result, judgments by confession are disfavored. Huish v. Sulenta, 2002 WY 139, 54 
Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 177 (quoting Alderman v. Diament, 7 N.J.L. 197, 198 (1824)). 
11 
5 This certification is an image from Worthington as displayed on Westlaw. 
Id. 
The foregoing was not signed by the claimant, but was signed instead by the 
notary public. It is a certification by a notary public that the claimant 
acknowledged to him that he executed the notice of lien, that he had read 
the contents, and that the same were true. However, in order to have a 
valid verification it is the claimant, and not the notary, who must sign that 
the contents are true. 
Id. As the Supreme Court found: 
,,5 18 Sept 85 
My Commission expires 
residing at t558(i II'. 3500 S. 
Notary Public 
I.I'/ A mold Allred 
On this !Jt/J day of Jamwr_r 1981. Personally 
appeared before me Edwin N. Kmball [sic]. who duly 
acknowledged lo me that he has executed this notice and 
that he has read the contents thereof, that the same is 
true of his own knowledge. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
STATE OF UTAH> 
certification appears: 
Supreme Court noted, "[a]ffixed below the claimant's signature the following 
not sign a correct written oath in the presence of a notary." Id. at 477. As the Utah 
situation similar to that here. There, the affiant signed a notice of lien. He, however, "did 
valid verification. In Worthington, 777 P.2d 475, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a 
12 
of "verification" directly imports the Supreme Court's definition for "valid verification" 
correct written oath or affirmation[.]" Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 564. Rule 58A(i)(2)'s use 
specifically what is required for there to be a "valid verification," which includes "a 
affirmation." [App. Br. at 12.] The Utah Supreme Court, however, has defined 
contends that Rule 58A(i)(2) has no requirement for a verification to be under "oath or 
To avoid the clear facial failing of the Confession of Judgment, Safe Home 
Court should reach the same conclusion as the Supreme Court did there. 
affirmation. With a striking resemblance to the invalid verification in Worthington, this 
information was subscribed and sworn to him. Munday did not sign any written oath or 
Notary." And then the notary, Safe Home's counsel, Mr. Prignano, asserts that the 




/.:fl~»- Edward Michael Prignano 
(({~} t<OTAR'r' PUSI.JC • STAiE OF lliA.H 
\~ ~ My Ccrrrn, Exp. 04/09J20l 7 
'"' Ccmmrmon # 665063 
The signature blocks on the Confession here are: 
As in Worthington, Munday did not validly verify the Confession of Judgment. 
13 
6 Los Angeles Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Noonan, 181 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 834, 839 
(1960), cited by Safe Home (App. at 13-14), is inapplicable as the California Supreme 
Court subsequently invalidated a procedure similar to Rule 58A. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 75. 
The other cases Safe Home cites - Coast to Coast Demolition & Crushing, Inc. v. Real 
Equity Pursuit, LLC, 226 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010) and Mullins v. Bellis, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 27 
(City Ct. 1949) - directly conflict with Utah Supreme Court precedent. 
7 App. Br. at 12. 
as defined in Mickelson and subsequently used in Worthington.6 
Safe Home's argument that Mickelson hinged upon the mechanic's lien statute 
requiring a verification to be under "the oath [ of the claimant ]"7 ignores the holding of 
Mickelson. The issue there was whether the verification "was invalid [because the 
claimant] admittedly did not make an oral averment as to the truthfulness of [the lien's] 
contents to the notary public before whom he appeared." Id. at 563. Even with statutory 
language requiring an oath, the Supreme Court held "[t]here is no minimum requirement 
that an oath be administered to the affiant or that the affiant must speak an oral oath or 
affirmation or raise his or her hand." Id. at 564 ( overruling prior precedent to the 
contrary). In other words, the Supreme Court dismissed the formalities of an oral oath, 
but specifically reaffirmed precedent regarding "the form of verification[,]" in writing, 
which is required for there to be compliance with the applicable statute requiring 
"verification." Id. ( citing First Security Mortgage Corp. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 
14 
1981); Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983)). Thus, Mickelson holds 
that a proper verification requires a written oath, regardless of formalities as to oral oaths. 
See Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 564-65 (J. Zimmerman, concurring) (discussing "technical 
swearing requirements"); id. at 566 (J. Durham, concurring) ("I do not join the Court 
wherein it fails and refuses to follow likewise good precedent which invalidates the 
notice of a mechanic's lien which is not verified under oath."). 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has stated as much. In State v. Gutierrez-Perez, 
2014 UT 11, 337 P.3d 205, the Supreme Court held that the Mickelson "requirements 
were clearly set forth in order to establish a rule for a valid verification." Id. at ,r 11 
( emphasis in original; citation omitted). And subsumed within those requirements is 
"that 'there must be a correct written oath or affirmation."' Id. ( citation omitted; 
emphasis added). 
Finally, Safe Home puts much emphasis on the 1933 decision in White v. Heber 
City, 26 P.2d 333 (1933). [App. Br. at 12-13.] Safe Home's reliance is misplaced for 
multiple reasons. First, Safe Home fails to discuss, let alone cite, subsequent decisions 
from the Utah Supreme Court, including Worthington & Kimball Const. Co., 777 P.2d 
475, which directly impact the issues here. Second, the Mickelson court, while not 
directly overruling White, discussed White in the same breath as Spangler v. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943) and Colman v. 
Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1984), both of which Mickelson overruled. See 767 
15 
P.2d at 564. At a minimum, Mickelson must be read to limit the extent of White. 
Third, White's holding is inapplicable to the facts here. In White, the main issue 
was what constituted a proper "verification" for the presentation of a claim to a city, so 
that the city could decide whether to accept or reject the claim. The City claimed that the 
verification standard should be the same as required for verification of pleadings, and that 
the verification at hand did not meet this standard. The court in White rejected this 
argument, saying that "such particularity was not required with respect to a claim 
presented to a municipality, as opposed to a claim in court." 26 P.2d at 335. The Utah 
Supreme Court noted the "principal purpose" of the statute was '"to afford the proper 
officers an opportunity to look into the facts and circumstances connected with the 
occurrence; to preserve the evidence of the existing conditions; to determine the liability 
of the municipality; and, in case liability exists, to effect a settlement without resort to 
litigation."' Id. (citing Connor v. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479, 481). 
Considering the principal purpose, the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is not seriously 
contended that the time, place, and circumstances of the injury and damage were not 
sufficiently stated. Thus, 'the principal purpose' as stated in Connor requiring the 
presentation of a claim was accomplished." Id. 
Thus, White is limited to cases involving the presentation of claims to a 
governmental agency. It has nothing to do with the verification required for papers filed 
in Court - particularly when those papers serve as the only basis for a judgment. 
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04/04/2018, at 12-13.] 
Munday argued the very issue in his Rule 10 Motion to this Court. [ See App. Docket, 
8 Safe Home's failure to address the jurat argument is even more curious considering that 
based).8 
defendant challenged only two of four findings upon which the sentencing decision was 
1998) (refusing to consider propriety of trial court's sentencing decision because 
court's decision [below] was based." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 (Utah Ct. App. 
"made clear that an appellant must address all of the circumstances upon which the 
failure to provide any argument as to this point is fatal to its appeal. This court has 
signer of the document produced evidence of his identity." [R.0985.] Safe Home's 
indication that the statement was voluntarily signed[]" and "there is no indication that the 
Judgment failed to have a proper jurat. As Judge Johnson found, the Confession had "no 
Safe Home fails to appeal Judge Johnson's finding that the Confession of 
B. Safe Home Fails To Address Judge Johnson's Other Findings 
Regarding An Inadequate Jurat. 
question. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Perez, 2014 UT 11,, 11. 
for there to be a proper verification, there must be a written oath signed by the person in 
subsequent decisions, including Mickelson and Worthington, have specifically stated that 
verification here was sufficient to meet the principal purpose of Rule 58A(i). Indeed, 
Moreover, even if White somehow applied, Safe Home fails to explain how the 
17 
distinctive nature of confessions of judgment, which the United States Supreme Court 
fees motions under Rule 73. [App. Br. at 15-18.] Safe Home's argument ignores the 
judgments under Rule 54 and default judgments under Rule 55, along with the attorneys' 
Rather than address Judge Johnson's analysis, Safe Home focuses on general 
calculating the "specified sum." 
ignores that its Confession of Judgment contains discretion and lacks any method of 
onto one phrase: "final specified amount[.]" [App. Br. at 15.] In doing so, Safe Home 
Safe Home does not address Judge Johnson's analysis. Rather, Safe Home latches 
[R.0986.] 
The equation given here to figure out the amount owed does not amount to 
a "specific sum. " It includes that certain amounts "may" be augmented. 
There is no information as to how the decision on those amounts will be 
made. The amount of attorneys 'fees and costs is unspecified. Any amount 
that may have been paid on this debt as referenced in the Judgment is not 
known. There was no final specified amount here for Munday to verify, had 
the statement been properly verified. Rule 58A requires that the "specified 
sum " be verified, and this judgment fails to meet that requirement. 
sense approach to the "specific sum" requirement. As she held: 
CIV. P. 58A(i)(l)-(2). In addressing the first prong, Judge Johnson applied a common- 
concisely the claim and that the specified sum does not exceed the liability." UTAH R. 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, the statement must state 
that the specified sum is due or to become due[]" and that "[i]f the judgment is for the 
Rule 58A(i) requires that a confession of judgment "concisely state the claim and 
C. Judge Johnson Correctly Found That The Confession Of Judgment 
Was Not For A "Specified Sum." 
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9 Rules 54 and 73 are inapposite. In both contexts, judgments have been entered after full 
litigation. Furthermore, Rule 73 contemplates motion practice to determine the amount 
called "the loosest way of binding a man's property that was ever devised in any civilized 
country." D.H Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 177 (citation omitted). Because confessions 
of judgment deprive a debtor of all due process, courts strictly scrutinize the entry of such 
judgments. See, e.g., Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53; Leidholm, 460 N.W.2d at 713; Isbell, 21 
Cal.3d at 75; Utah Nat'/ Bank, 13 Utah at 177; Lathrem, 168 Ohio St. at 188. 
On the other hand, with default judgments, a party has been served notice, had an 
opportunity to defend, and has otherwise not appeared. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(a). 
Moreover, Rule 55 requires an evidentiary hearing if, among other reasons, a claim is not 
for a "sum certain." Id. at 55(b)(2). In addressing this provision, the Utah Supreme 
Court has required that a plaintiff put forth "credible evidence" of the claimed amount, 
even if the complaint sets forth a certain sum. See Cadlerock Joint Venture II, LP v. 
Envelope Packaging of Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 98, ,r,r 11-13, 251 P.3d 837 (discussing 
Supreme Court precedent). For example, in Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a default judgment where the complaint set forth damages of 
$16,000 for damage to real property, with $5,000 being the value of destroyed trees and 
punitive damages of$10,000. 589 P.2d 767, 768-69 (Utah 1978). Even with numbers set 
forth in the complaint, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the entry of a default judgment 
and sent the matter back to the trial court. Id. at 769.9 
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of attorneys' fees, including an opportunity to oppose. See generally UTAH R. CIV. P. 73. 
10 In the District Court, Munday argued that $80,000 of the signing bonus was paid to buy 
him out of a previous contract, thus benefiting Safe Home. Munday sought a credit for 
that amount. [See, e.g., R.0289-290; R.0464; R.0471; R.0473; R.808.] Thus, there was a 
dispute as to what payments had been made, if Munday was liable, further rendering the 
Confession of Judgment lacking a "specified sum." 
11 While Safe Home has cherry-picked confession of judgment cases from across the 
State, Munday provided Judge Johnson with all of the cases in which Safe Home filed a 
seemingly identical confession of judgment, at that point in time, including the decisions 
reached by each district court judge. [ See id.] 
As noted above, the calculation set forth in the Confession of Judgment is not for a 
"sum certain" or "specified sum." It allowed for augmentation by discretion. It did not 
provide any method of calculation. And there was no statement as to payments applied.'? 
Safe Home points to "Representative Confessions of Judgment entered in Utah" in 
support of its argument that common-sense allegedly dictates confessions of judgment 
may be augmented. [App. 19, Ex. E.] Safe Home's "representative" sample, however, 
omits numerous directly relevant decisions. In the following cases, as provided to Judge 
Johnson below [see R.0502-504],11 judges rejected Safe Home's confessions of judgment 
on similar grounds as Judge Johnson did here: Safe Home v. Elgin, Case No. 170400746; 
Safe Home v. Clyde, Case No. 170400314; Safe Home v. Van Oakes, Case No. 
20 
12 In each of the district court cases cited by Safe Home, not one defendant appeared with 
counsel to contest the entry of judgment. Counsel has reviewed each docket for each 
case, and there is no attorney designation for any of the debtors. As such, judgments 
were entered without any challenge. 
170400176; and Safe Home v. Sprinkle, Case No. 140401152. [See R.0502-0504.] And 
there are other similar cases, including: Swick v. Preble, Case No. 160400551 (4th Jud. 
Dist., J. Taylor) [Munday App'x at I] and ARM Security, Inc. v. Gines, Case No. 
160401127 (4th Jud. Dist., J. Low) [Munday App'x at 2]. 
As to those cases submitted by Safe Home, a review of the confessions of 
judgment at issues show at least some are different from Safe Home's discretionary and 
facially inadequate Confession at issue here. For example, in Cedar Springs 
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Graham, Case No. 150700893, the signed Confession 
provided a balance owing and set forth a method for computing a remaining balance, 
including that Cedar Springs would file "an affidavit stating the delinquent balance owing 
by Graham." [Munday App'x. at 3.] Likewise, in American Management Services, Inc. 
v. Houston, Case No. 160500018, the Confession of Judgment had a specific itemization 
for fees and interest, along with specific payments to be applied. [Munday App'x at 4.] 
Those judgments are thus distinguishable from the one at hand, which contains no 
provision for a declaration or determination of figures to be used in the formula. 12 
Safe Home also argues that even if the augmentation portions of the Confession of 
21 
13 Cited in Snyder v. Labor Comm 'n, 2017 UT App 187, ,r 13, 405 P.3d 084. Moreover, 
Safe Home did not present this argument to the District Court either waiving right to 
review on appeal. See infra p. 22 (citing State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ,r 13, 236 
P.3d 155). 
14 See supra Note 10 (providing citations to where Munday argued below he deserved an 
$80,000 credit, at a minimum). 
Judgment are invalid, that the Confession of Judgment should still stand. [ App. Br. at 
19.J Safe Home has not developed this argument sufficiently to be addressed on appeal. 
An issue is inadequately briefed if "the argument merely contains bald citations to 
authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ,r 11, 391 P.3d 196 (alteration in 
original) ( citation and internal quotations marks omitted). While inadequate briefing is 
not "an absolute bar to review of an argument on appeal," a party that "fails to adequately 
brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion[.]" Rose v. Office 
of Prof! Conduct, 2017 UT 50, ,r 64, 424 P.3d 134 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 13 
The argument fails in any event. Safe Home fails to explain how the augmentation 
is separable from the Confession of Judgment overall. Moreover, Safe Home ignores that 
Munday contended below that he deserved, at a minimum, a credit for $80,000. 
Therefore, not only is the augmentation suspect, but so is the principal amount.14 
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As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has called a judgment by 
Finally, Safe Home did not raise its "waiver" argument to the trial court. 
Therefore, the issue is not properly on appeal. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ,i 13 ("[I]n 
order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such 
a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Again, even if the Court addresses the argument, it fails. 
First, Safe Home cites no case where waiver was applied to a confession of judgment. 
Second, Safe Home bears the burden of proof to prove waiver. See, e.g., IHC Health 
Servs., Inc. v. D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,i 16, 196 P.3d 588. Moreover, '"waiver is 
an intensely fact dependent question."' Id. ( citing IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K 
Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ,i 7, 73 P.3d 320) (alteration omitted). Safe Home is improperly 
making this factually-sensitive inquiry in the first instance in the Court of Appeals, and 
its argument on this point should be rejected accordingly. 
D. Rule 58A(i) Is Unconstitutional. 
As currently written, UTAH R. Crv. P 58A(i), which sets out the procedure for a 
judgment by confession, violates the Due Process of the United States Constitution. In 
particular, the Rule fails to require the plaintiff to place evidence before the Court of the 
defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to notice and an opportunity to be 
heard as to the amount owed. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61, 577 P .2d 188 
(1978). 
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confession "the loosest way of binding a man's property that was ever devised in any 
civilized country." D.H. Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 177 (quoting Alderman, 7 N.J.L. at 
198). As a result, judgments by confession are disfavored. Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53. 
Indeed, statutes and rules for a confession of judgment are "viewed with skepticism" and 
"strictly construed." Leidholm, 460 N.W.2d at 713 (interpreting Rule 68 of North Dakota 
Rules of Civil Procedure); Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53. 
The statutory process for anything that works a summary deprivation of property, 
even if that deprivation is temporary, must satisfy Due Process by allowing for notice and 
an opportunity to be heard. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating certain 
processes for prejudgment writs ofreplevin); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay 
View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (invalidating procedure for summarily garnishing wages before 
judgment). There can be exceptions only for "extraordinary situations," Fuentes, 407 U.S. 
at 90-91, or when there is a clear, knowing, and voluntary waiver of that right to process, 
D.H Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 184. Conversely, the process for a judgment by 
confession is invalid if the summary process fails to obtain evidence of one of these two 
exceptions. 
Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61 (1978) is the lead case to evaluate a 
confession of judgment statute for Due Process concerns. In that case, the California 
Supreme court invalidated a statute substantially similar to the one here. Both the 
California confession of judgment statute and Rule 58A(i) allow for a judgment to be 
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15 The California Supreme Court's ruling was also strictly prospective in nature and did 
not affect judgments entered before that time. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 7 4-75. Munday 
similarly seeks only prospective relief here. 
entered based on a writing, signed by the defendant under oath. The judgment must be for 
a specified sum, must state concisely the facts out of which it arose, and show that the sum 
is justly due. Compare former CAL. Crv CODE § 1133 ( quoted in Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 67 
n.3) with UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i). 
The California Supreme Court held that the debtor's "execution of the confession of 
judgment ... fails to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. 
Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 70 ( emphasis in original)). It also noted that the statute did not provide 
for a case-by-case review to determine the validity of the waiver. Id. at 71. It also said 
that the ability to seek post-judgment relief is an insufficient cure because it does not occur 
at a "meaningful time." Id. at 71-72.15 As such, the California statute for judgments by 
confession was unconstitutional. 
Rule 58A(i) violates the Isbell prescription for Due Process. The Rule does not 
require prejudgment notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment by confession 
is entered. The only evidence required is a "verified statement" by defendant as to certain 
facts, with nothing additional to show the confession is knowing and voluntary. Nothing 
in the rule provides for a case by case determination of the waiver's validity. Rule 58A(i) 
also says that the court clerk "must sign the judgment for the specified sum." As Isbell 
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notes, the risk of an involuntary or knowing waiver is high, and the signed statement 
( which need not be made with the assistance of counsel) is not in and of itself proof of a 
valid waiver. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 64, 70-71. As Isbell also notes, the right to a motion to 
set aside the judgment is insufficient to cure the deficiency. Id. at 75. As such, Rule 
58A(i) fails to pass constitutional muster, and the judgment at hand must be set aside. 
Even if the statute or rule authorizing judgments by confession passes 
Constitutional muster, no such judgment is valid unless the defendant voluntarily, 
intelligently, and knowingly waived his or her Due Process rights to prejudgment notice 
and a hearing. D.H Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 187; Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 
(1972). As a result, the Court must conduct a "case-by-case, fact-specific review" of the 
facts leading to the judgment by confession whenever that judgment is challenged. 
Leidholm, 460 N.W.2d at 714. The creditor also bears the burden of proof to establish 
the validity of the waiver. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 75. This is because the waiver is of a 
constitutional right. State v. McCormick, 385 N.W.2d 121, 124 (S.D. 1986). See also 
State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ,r 15, 79 P.3d 937 (prosecution bears burden of proving 
waiver of constitutional rights; voluntarily absence of presence from hearing may not be 
presumed). In addition, the Courts must "indulge every reasonable presumption against 
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." Wagstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 
(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). See also D.H 
Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 186 (no presumed acquiescence of the loss of fundamental 
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challenge as well as for findings as to knowing and voluntary waiver. 
minimum, the case should be remanded for consideration of Munday' s constitutional 
constitutional rights as Judge Johnson did not need to reach the issue. Therefore, at a 
16 There are no findings in the record ofMunday's knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
While [the Confession of Judgment} rule of civil procedure allows litigants 
to bypass the initial stages of a civil case and proceed straight to judgment, 
however, suggests the opposite. As Judge Johnson succinctly stated: 
constitute a "civil action" as the Reciprocal Fee Statute uses that term. Common sense, 
Safe Home argues that a proceeding for a confession of judgment does not 
attorney fees to a "party that prevails"). 
agreement. See UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826 (providing that the court may award 
moreover, is that the party requesting fees prevail in a civil action based upon a written 
27-56.5 (prior version of §788-5-826). A prerequisite to either of these conditions, 
'allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees."' Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §78- 
must be 'based upon any written contract,' and the second is that the contract "must 
Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 114, 160 P.3d 1041. The first condition is that "the civil action 
to a prevailing party in a civil action if two main conditions are met." Bilanzich v. 
Pursuant to the Reciprocal Fee Statute, "a court may award costs and attorney fees 




to satisfy bringing a "civil action." Id. at 1 14. The Court of Appeals answered 
question of whether a notice of claim under the Governmental Immunity Act was enough 
example, Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, 243 P.3d 500, involved the 
contexts. Neither case cited by Safe Home, however, reaches the result it seeks. For 
Rather, Safe Home latches onto the phrase "civil action" and then cites cases in other 
Safe Home fails to cite any cases interpreting UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826. 
an expansive interpretation to include all proceedings before a civil court within the state. 
action" in Rule 58A and, by extension UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826, must be ascribed 
principles the remaining rules flow, including Rule 58A. Therefore, the use of "civil 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." From these bedrock 
R. Civ. P. 1 states that the Rules "shall be liberally construed and applied to achieve the 
states: "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."' Likewise, Utah 
LLC v. Interstate Inv. Grp., LLC, 2011 UT 82, 117, 267 P.3d 923. UTAH R. CIV. P. 2 
The Rules of Civil Procedure should be read as a whole. Aequitas Enterprises, 
[R.1081.] 
that does not change the fact that a confession of judgment, once entered, is 
a civil judgment which is subject to collection pursuant to civil procedural 
rules. Indeed, as noted by Munday, in Utah there is only "one form of 
action to be known as a 'civil action. '" URCP 2. The rule which permitted 
Safe Home's Confession of Judgment is included among the rules of 
procedure which govern civil actions. Furthermore, a confession of 
judgment fits well within the boundaries of a 'civil judgment' as defined by 
Black's Law Dictionary: "any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to 
determination, will result in a judgment or decree. The action is said to 
terminate at judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY {J01h ed. 2014). 
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negatively and held that "the Legislature consciously selected the term 'civil action' and 
intended that it be used in accordance with its common and accepted meaning." Id. at 
,r 15. The "common and accepted meaning" of"civil action" is, at a minimum, that used 
in UTAH R. Crv. P. 2. Moreover, "Black's Law Dictionary defines 'civil action' as '[a]n 
action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a private or civil right; a noncriminal 
litigation.'" Raymond James Fin. Serves., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 S.3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013) 
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (9th ed. 2009)). See also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 
U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (similar). This definition fits squarely with UTAH R. Crv. P. 2. 
Safe Home's reliance on Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 
2007 UT 17, 156 P.3d 782, is equally unavailing. In the cited portion, ,r,r 46-47, this 
Court rejected BYU's attempts to "enforce[] claims [against shareholders of a dissolved 
corporation] in summary collection proceedings." Id. at ,r 47. This Court stated that "a 
civil action means a proceeding subject to the full spectrum of due process safeguards." 
Id. In stating its concern over shareholders not receiving appropriate due process in the 
type of proceeding at hand, this Court held that it did "not believe that the legislature 
intended, or that our constitution would permit, an enforcement proceeding against a non- 
party shareholder to take place in the setting of a post-judgment collection effort." Id. 
Neither case addresses the actual scope of what constitutes a "civil action" and, more 
precisely, whether a confession of judgment falls within that purview. As detailed above, 
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17 More particularly, a properly drafted and implemented process for confession by 
judgment also provides the due process safeguards that troubled the Court in Tremco. As 
shown below, Rule 58A(i) is not that properly drafted statute. The fact that the current 
scheme does not satisfy Due Process, however, means that the judgment at hand should 
be set aside regardless. 
it clearly does. See, e.g., UTAH R. CIV. P. 2.17 
Furthermore, Safe Home fails to address the policy underlying UTAH CODE ANN. 
§788-5-826. The purpose of this statute is to eliminate "'unequal exposure to the risk of 
contractual liability for attorney fees."' Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ,I 
77, 201 P.3d 966 (quoting Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ,I 19). The statute thus "affords to the 
party not benefited by a contractual attorney fee provision the same access to attorney 
fees that the provision explicitly affords to the other party." PC Crane Service, LLC v. 
McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 61, ,I 23, 273 P.3d 396. While discretionary, the 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that "to creat[ e] a level playing field," the "courts 
should award fees liberally under [the statute] where pursuing or defending an action 
results in an unequal exposure to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees." 
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, at,I,I 18, 19. As Judge Johnson correctly found, Safe Home's 
argument would reach an absurd result that is an affront to the policy underlying UT AH 
CODE ANN. §788-5-826, which is to implement a level playing field. 
Overall, Judge Johnson's conclusion is sound: 
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Safe Home wants to saddle Munday with a six-figure judgment based upon a 
CONCLUSION 
fees on appeal, with remand to District Court to determine amount). 
appeal. See Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 181 P.3d 791, 798 (granting attorneys' 
a determination of Munday' s reasonable attorneys' fees incurred on defending this 
Munday respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to Judge Johnson solely for 
Court affirms Judge Johnson's order, including the award of attorneys' fees, then 
198 P.3d 990 (citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)). If this 
Holladay Towne Center, LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, ,r 22, 
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826. "[W]hen a party who received attorney fees 
he prevails on this appeal. Judge Johnson awarded Munday his attorneys' fees below 
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9), Munday is entitled to his attorneys' fees if 
III. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) Claim for Attorneys' Fees. 
submits that this Court should reach the same conclusion. 
(Id. at 3-4 (citing PC Crane Service, LLC, 2012 UT App 61, ,r 23.) Munday respectfully 
While Utah s Rules of Civil Procedure permit litigants to seek a judgment 
without filing a complaint, that does not change the fundamental nature of 
what confessions of judgment are. They are civil actions governed by civil 
procedural rules. Moreover, Safe Homes interpretation directs an absurd 
result, where it is permitted to seek attorneys fees [ o J n its claim, while 
denying the defendant those same fees should the defendant prevail. This 
would thwart the policy behind the reciprocal attorney fees statute, which is 
intended to eliminate unequal exposure to the risk of contractual liability 
for attorney fees. 
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flawed Confession of Judgment. Judge Johnson correctly found that the Confession of 
Judgment at issue failed in several respects, including a lack of valid verification by 
Munday. On appeal, Safe Home relies upon White v. Heber City from 1933. In doing so, 
Safe Home ignores Supreme Court precedent from over a half-century later. Safe 
Home's attempt to distinguish Mickelson, upon which Judge Johnson relied, fails based 
upon the holding in Mickelson. While Safe Home focuses on "oath or affirmation," the 
Mickelson Court specifically held that all that is needed is a valid written oath- signed by 
the defendant himself - for there to be a valid verification. The Confession of Judgment 
fails in that regard. 
Even if there was a valid verification (which there was not), Safe Home fails to 
address Judge Johnson's order in regards to the missing elements of the jurat. Failing to 
address that issue on appeal dooms Safe Home's appeal. 
In regards to the "specified sum" requirement, Safe Home completely disregards 
Judge Johnson's sound, common-sense reading of the Confession of Judgment here as 
impermissibly allowing for discretion, among other flaws. Safe Home opts to make a 
technical argument about "specified sums" being augmented, pointing to Rules 54, 55, 
and 73, UTAH R. Crv. P. But even those rules do not provide Safe Home with the support 
it seeks. Under those rules, there is due process allowed by, at a minimum, an 
evidentiary hearing. Here, Safe Home wants to strip Munday of all process, and allow 
for unfettered augmentation of the stated sum in the Confession of Judgment. Indeed, 
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to the District Court for a determination of fees incurred on appeal. 
In sum, this Court should: 1) deny Safe Home's Appeal; and 2) remand this case 
Munday of the same possibility. 
prevailed, it most certainly would have sought fees. There is no sound reason to deprive 
behind UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-5-826 - to level the playing field. If Safe Home 
alone even cite, Rule 2. Moreover, Safe Home's argument ignores the primary purpose 
that there is one form of action - a "civil action." Safe Home entirely fails to address, let 
appeal for this Court to find otherwise. Among other reasons, UTAH R. CIV. P. 2 states 
constitute a "civil action," and Safe Home does not provide any persuasive basis on 
Johnson rejected Safe Home's argument that a Confession of Judgment does not 
Finally, Judge Johnson properly awarded fees and costs to Munday. Judge 
credit. Safe Home fails to address this issue. 
because Munday argued below that, at a minimum, he should be afforded an $80,000 
even the principal amount stated in the Confession of Judgment, $160,000, is contested 
33 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Jared 
Munday 
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SAFE HOME CONTROL, INC., 
---0000000--- 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
' 
EXHIBIT "1" 
amount." The statement includes a stipulation that "[jjudgment creditor hereby expressly 
Page 1 of 3 
Confession of Judgment, and adding attorneys' fees, costs, and any applicable interest on said 
payments, if any, that Judgment Creditor receives from Judgment Debtor after the date of this 
"[i]t is further agreed that the Judgment Amount shall be determined by subtracting those 
Judgment and the date the Judgment maybe filed with the Court." The stipulation also states that 
Debtor shall have paid to Judgment Creditor between the date of execution of the Confession of 
at the statutory post-judgment interest rate until paid ... less such amounts as the Judgment 
of Judgment by Confession against him in the principal amount of $10,000 ''plus interest thereon 
Judgment" includes the statement that the Defendant "hereby authorizes and consents to the entry 
that any summons or other process has been provided to the Defendant. The "Confession of 
pleading and has submitted the proposed judgment. There is nothing in the Court file to indicate 
judgment. The Plaintiff has filed a "Confession of Judgment", without further complaint or 
This matter is before the Court because the Plaintiff has asked the Court to enter 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------- 
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor Defendant 
Case Number: i w04 0055/ Roger J. Preble, 
Date: June 20, 2016 vs. 
Ruling Denying Judgment by Confession Plaintiff 
Alan Swick, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILGO 
JUN 2 0 ·2016 
Page 2 of 3 
stipulates and agrees that the sum that is specified as the Judgment Amount shall be deemed to 
be "justly due" and shall be deemed to constitute "a specified sum" within the scope of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure." 
The "Confession of Judgment" was signed on October 16, 2012 and filed with the Court 
on April 13, 2016. 
Rule 58A, URCP, authorizes the Court to enter judgment based upon confession of the 
Defendant where authorized by statute. Judgment by confession is authorized by U.C.A. § 788- 
5-205. A party seeking judgment by confession must file a statement, verified by the defendant, 
which includes a concise statement of the specified sum due and authorizes judgment for the 
specified sum. 
In this case the stipulation recites the amount due at the time of the stipulation but leaves 
it to the Plaintiff, or the Court, to calculate the balance due upon default. The judgment, based 
upon default determined without any mechanism for recourse or review, would be entered, again, 
without any mechanism for review or even objection. This Court is of the view that such a one- 
sided arrangement without even the possibility of notice and opportunity to be heard on the 
critical questions of default and the balance due violates the fundamental notion of due process. 
Indeed, due process of law requires, at a minimum, "adequate notice to those with an interest in 
the matter and an opportunity for them to be heard in a meaningful manner" and is "owed in 
every instance" before a person may be deprived of property. Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, ,r 28, 156 P.3d 782. The Court recognizes that the parties may 
have made a contract, in this case signed a promissory note (which has not been provided to the 
Court) to settle an apparently disputed sum. The Court has no intention of ignoring the contract. 
However, in this case there is an additional duty for the Plaintiff and the Court to give credit for 
payments made during' the nearly 4 year period between execution of the Confession of Judgment 
and filing with the Court. A request for judgment, even for the designated sum but without any 
credit for payments is an implicit assertion that no payments have been made but without any 
proof or way to establish that critical fact. 
In order to preserve due process and ensure that the authority of the Court is not 
arbitrarily imposed, the Court will require that adequate notice be given of the Plaintiffs intent to 
seek judgment without any credit for any payments. Moreover, since the "Confession of 
Judgment" is not for a sum certain but, rather, for an amount to be calculated it is the conclusion 
of this Court that commencement of this action must begin by obtaining jurisdiction upon the 
Defendant through service of process as outlined in Rules 3 and 4, URCP, together with the 
payment of an appropriate filing fee. 
The immediate request for execution of the proposed judgment is denied. 
EXHIBIT "2" 
1 of 3 March 23, 2017 03:07 PM 
Having reviewed Addison Gines' motion to dismiss filed on January 27, 2017, and pursuant 
Judge: Thomas Low 
Civil No. 160401127 
(Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims) 





ARM SECURITY, INC., 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE FOURTH JUDIClAL DlSTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
1···::·~~·; ..~~I.~~·;·;;>. 
The Order of the Court is stated below: / . ,,,-'~1:;,.,. · \ 
Dated: March 23, 2017 Isl Thomal;f..9,y&&,) j 
03:07: 15 PM Districf.f_9Wf,J°[clgc/ 
--<.!1·i ,._ t \~>·" 
Christopher J. Cheney, #15572 
OLSEN SKOUBYE & NIELSON, LLC 
999 Murray Holladay Road, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (80 I) 365-1030 
Facsimile: (801) 365- l 031 
Email: chris@osnlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2of 3 March 23, 2017 03:07 PM 
I hereby certify that on the I oth day of March, 2017, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
RULING & ORDER (Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims) was delivered to the party identified below 
by electronic email delivery for approval as to form. 
I hereby further certify that on this 23rd day of March, 2017, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
I. Rule 58A(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the defendant authorize the 
entry of the judgment for a specified sum. 
2. The confession of judgment in this case anticipated that Defendant would satisfy the 
liability it was created to represent and, therefore, not be filed. 
3. It is disputed in this case whether Defendant satisfied any portion of the liability 
represented by the confession of judgment. 
4. Under these circumstances, Defendant is entitled to be sued for breach of contract or 
unjust enrichment, or some other cause of action so that he can defend against a judgment entering 
for the full amount represented by the confession of judgment. 
5. Allowing the confession of judgment to enter without affording Defendant the right to 
defend himself as to the merits or amounts of the liability would violate his rights to due process. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS: 
I. Addison's motion requesting the Court dismiss this action is GRANTED. 
2. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
End ofDOCUMENT-cOURT SEAL LOCATED AT TOP OF DOCUMENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
RULING 
to the oral arguments held on February 24, 2017, the Court makes the following RULINGS and 
ORDER. 
EXHIBIT "3" 
Springs Homeowners Association, Inc and against Defendant, Linda Kay Graham, in the amount of 
Homeowners Association, Inc. Defendant hereby authorizes the Court to enter judgment for Cedar 
as of June 24, 2014, for homeowner association fees owed by Defendant to Cedar Springs 
Springs Homeowners Association, Inc in the amount of$ I ,209.92. This sum is the balance justly due 
and Rule SSA of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby confesses judgment in favor of Cedar 
Defendant Linda Kay Graham, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-205 
Judge: LINDA KAY GRAHAM, 
Case No. vs. 
Plaintiff, 
CEDAR SPRINGS HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC, JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION 
Defendant. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DA VIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RlCHA RD W. JoNES - #3938 
RJONES@UTAHA TTORNEYS.COM 
TAYLOR R. JONES - # 14690 
TJONES@UTAH ATTORNEYS.COM 
HELGESEN, HOUTZ & JONES 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
5732 SOUTH 1475 EAST, SUITE 200 
SOUTH OGDEN, UT AH 84403 
TELEPHONE: (801) 479-4777 
Pag(: 2 
~· ~~~--- c)J~ll)' ~I ic 
Se nl crncru Stipulation- Cedar SpringsfGr.ia111/ 
The foregoing Settlement Stipulation was executed before me this --1.1!. day of /¢,v,/ 
___ , 20J 4, by Linda Kay Graham, whose identity was made known to me. 0 
SS. 
COUNTY OF ___.W-c...=._· __ 
) STATE OF UTAH NOTARY PUBLIC Brett Barber 
676085 
My Commission Expires 




Auorney for Cedar ings 
Homeowners Association, Inc 
HELGESEN, HOUTZ & JONES 
states that defendant is not in the military service. 
""' /l.tif 
DATED this _L day of J.H:11-y, 2014. 
5. Pursuant to the Federal Service Member's Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §520, the defendant 
established by affidavit. 
by Cedar Springs in collecting the judgment by execution or otherwise, as shall be 
shall be entitled to augment the Judgment by the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred 
4. Should Cedar Springs obtain a Judgment by Confession as provided herein, Cedar Springs 
balance owing by Graham. 
the Court by Cedar Springs, it shall be supported by an affidavit stating the delinquent 
that are to applied Lo the delinquent balance. Tf a Judgment by Confession is submitted to 
balance shall be computed as follows: $1,209.92, less those payments received from Graham 








2011. day of this 
The defendant will pay a minimum of $50.00, per month 
by the 4/25/2011 and every 30 day(s) after until paid in full. 
In the event that the debtor misses a payment or pays late, 
the Plantiff may file the judgment by confession with the Court 
and seek all remedies available by law, including but not 
limited to, garnishment, supplemental proceedings, writ of 
execution,attachm t, augmentation of judgment for post-judgment 
at costs. 
- 5 .. -The..,E'_laint_.1;Jf.will.,ag_f~,J1ot_!_o,.file.,.the Judgment by confessiqn. 




4. The Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of Plaintiff's costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to Rule 73 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, expended in collecting said Judgment by execution 
or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
3. The total Judgment amount of $2945.34 shall bear interest at the 
legal rate. 
2. Itemization of amounts awarded are as follows: Principal: $607.58 
Collection Costs: $ 1091.29, Interest Fees: $1246.47, NSF Fees: $0.00, 
Check Service Fee: $0.00, $0.00, Damages: $0.00, 
TOTAL: $2945.34 
The Defendant CRYSTAL F. HOUSTON hereby execut a '~nd consent to 
Judgment by Confession as follows: 
.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED I ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant, bi:i~·ed.·on 
Defendants failure to pay the balance on the account with the 
Plaintiff, together with costs as set forth below. 
J ----- - ...... ..-::--- .. __ .._,-;,_ ·CiV'il~NO:·::--.:-~ ~-=::::, ~=-- -, ""!,,,..,,..... .. 
Judge: 
CRYSTAL F. HOUSTON 
:--529-23~2149 
Defendants 
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. a Utah Corporation 
Plantiff, 
vs. 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
American Management Servicei 
50 E. 100 S. Suite 100 A 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone.: (435)-688-8443 
Facsimile: (435) -688-8423 
Email: meg~n@amssg.net 
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a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via U.S. Mail and email to: 
APPELLEE was filed with the Court of Appeals via personal filing. I further certify that 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
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